Agency Directors And Network Centrality: An Examination Of Resource Dependencies by Shrader, Charles B. et al.
Management Publications Management
Spring 1991
Agency Directors And Network Centrality: An
Examination Of Resource Dependencies
Charles B. Shrader
Iowa State University, cshrader@iastate.edu
Alan N. Hoffman
Bentley College
Timothy M. Stearns
Marquette University
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/management_pubs
Part of the Organizational Behavior and Theory Commons, and the Other Business Commons
The complete bibliographic information for this item can be found at http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/
management_pubs/3. For information on how to cite this item, please visit http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/
howtocite.html.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Management at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Management Publications by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Agency Directors And Network Centrality: An Examination Of Resource
Dependencies
Abstract
A basic tenet of resource dependence theory is organizations must obtain resources from their environments
in order to survive (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Ac- cording to the theory, there are several strategic factors
that affect how organizations manage inter- organizational resource exchanges. These strategic factors include
(1) interlocking of board of director members, (2) joint programs or joint ventures, (3) organization size, and
(4) top administrator contacts with other organizations (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978: 143-69). Organizations
engage in these activities to reduce uncertainty and to develop favorable linkages in interorganizational
networks
Disciplines
Organizational Behavior and Theory | Other Business
Comments
This article is from Journal of Managerial Issues 3 (1991): 46. Posted with permission.
This article is available at Iowa State University Digital Repository: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/management_pubs/3
  Pittsburg State University is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Managerial
Issues.
http://www.jstor.org
Agency Directors And Network Centrality: An Examination Of Resource Dependencies 
Author(s): Charles B. Shrader, Alan N. Hoffman and Timothy M. Stearns 
Source:   Journal of Managerial Issues, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring 1991), pp. 46-61
Published by:  Pittsburg State University
Stable URL:  http://www.jstor.org/stable/40603898
Accessed: 27-02-2015 16:32 UTC
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at 
 http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
This content downloaded from 129.186.176.188 on Fri, 27 Feb 2015 16:32:15 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
JOURNAL OF MANAGERIAL ISSUES 
Voi III Number 1 Spring 1991 .46-61 
Agency Directors And Network Centrality: An 
Examination Of Resource Dependencies 
Charles B. Shrader 
Associate Professor of Management 
Iowa State University 
Alan N. Hoffman 
Associate Professor of Management 
Bentley College 
Timothy M. Stearns 
Assistant Professor of Management 
Marquette University 
A basic tenet of resource de- 
pendence theory is organizations 
must obtain resources from their 
environments in order to survive 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Ac- 
cording to the theory, there are 
several strategic factors that affect 
how organizations manage inter- 
organizational resource exchanges. 
These strategic factors include (1) 
interlocking of board of director 
members, (2) joint programs or 
joint ventures, (3) organization size, 
and (4) top administrator contacts 
with other organizations (Pfeffer 
and Salancik 1978: 143-69). Orga- 
nizations engage in these activities 
to reduce uncertainty and to de- 
velop favorable linkages in inter- 
organizational networks. 
An interorganizational network 
is defined as an identifiable set of 
organizations which are tied or 
linked to one another through spe- 
cific types of resource exchanges 
(Aldrich, 1979; Lincoln, 1982). 
Prior research on interorganiza- 
tional networks has focused on 
both coordination and differentia- 
tion of resource exchanges within 
various service delivery networks 
(Boje and Whetten, 1981). The 
present study examines the ex- 
change of resources within an iden- 
tifiable set of service delivery 
organizations. Specifically, we test 
the effects of engagement in co- 
ordinative activities uch as admin- 
istrator contacts, interlocks, joint 
programs and organization size on 
network power and dependence. 
In so doing, we strive to further 
clarify the role that organizational 
activities can have on network cen- 
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An Examination Of Resource Dependencies 47 
trality and thus further understand 
the process by which organizations 
can enhance their survival through 
acquisition of critical resources 
from the environment. 
Interorganizational Network 
Centrality 
Researchers have found central- 
ity to be an important variable in 
the study of resource exchange net- 
works (Hoffman, Stearns, and 
Shrader, 1990). Network centrality 
is defined as the extent to which 
an organization is the object or 
source of short, dense chains or re- 
lations among organizations (Lin- 
coln, 1982). The shorter and more 
direct the paths, the greater the or- 
ganization's centrality. 
The implication of network cen- 
trality is dependent on the type of 
resource exchange under consid- 
eration (Shrader, Dellva, and 
McElroy, 1989). A central organi- 
zation may be either powerful or 
dependent on other organizations 
in the network as a result of the 
flow of the resources being ex- 
changed (Freeman, 1978/79; Mar- 
iolis and Jones, 1982; Oliver, 1990). 
If an organization is central in a 
network due primarily to the send- 
ing of the resources to other or- 
ganizations, then it is considered to 
be relatively powerful because it is 
a source of resources for other or- 
ganizations (Boje and Whetten, 
1981; Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990). 
If an organization is central in net- 
work due primarily to receiving re- 
sources, then it is considered 
dependent within the resource net- 
work (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Power, according to Pfeffer and 
Salancik, refers to the organiza- 
tion's ability to control scarce in- 
formation and resources. Beyond 
simple acquisition of resources, 
scarce resources are those that are 
difficult o obtain, and not all or- 
ganizations are proficient or suc- 
cessful in securing them. By 
securing scarce resources, an or- 
ganization reduces uncertainty and 
is more likely to survive. Centrality 
reflects the organization's position 
and relative success with respect to 
these critical resource exchanges 
(Rogers, 1974a). 
Agencies in social service net- 
works confront uncertain environ- 
ments and consequently, strive for 
interorganizational coordination 
(Shrader et al., 1989). Studies of 
community service agencies indi- 
cate strong positive relationshps be- 
tween network centrality and 
resource dependencies (Aldrich, 
1976; Rogers, 1974a). Theorists 
caution, however, that the substan- 
tive content of resource exchanges 
within a network must be consid- 
ered before resource dependencies 
can be inferred (Galaskiewicz, 
1985). The purpose of this study, 
therefore, is to examine the effects 
of the coordinative activities iden- 
tified by Pfeffer and Salancik - in- 
terlocks, joint programs, director 
contacts, board size, and organiza- 
tion size - on substantive client and 
service exchanges in a youth service 
agency network. 
Gentrality and Interlocking 
Directorates 
Pfeffer and Salancik hypothesize 
that organizations use boards of di- 
rectors for "coopting important ex- 
ternal organizations with which 
they are interdependent" (1978: 
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167). This coopting activity is re- 
ferred to as an interlocking direc- 
torate and is argued to facilitate 
stable interorganizational resource 
exchanges. That is, interlocking di- 
rectorates are viewed as means of 
linking organizations in which 
friendships can develop, commu- 
nication can easily flow, and plans 
can be made. An interlock is 
thought to exist when a person be- 
longs to the board of directors of 
two or more organizations (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978; Pennings, 
1980). 
Prior research suggests that in- 
terlocks among organization direc- 
torates are fairly common in both 
the public and private sectors, but 
there is little in the literature that 
specifically explains the results of 
these coordinated activities. For in- 
stance, Pennings (1980) found that 
financially stable organizations 
were more likely to interlock their 
directorates with those of individ- 
uals serving on the boards of fi- 
nancial institutions. Pennings also 
found a strong relationship be- 
tween interlocking directorates and 
network centrality. Mintz and 
Schwartz (1981) suggest that or- 
ganizations engage in interlocks to 
gain access to critical financial in- 
formation and other resources. 
Their study of Fortune 500 firms 
found the largest financial institu- 
tions to be most central in a net- 
work. They also concluded that 
resource exchanges were of lesser 
importance than joint ventures and 
director interlocks with banks. Pfef- 
fer (1973), in a study of 57 hos- 
pitals, found that board members 
are chosen primarily to provide re- 
source linkages between the hos- 
pital and important resource 
suppliers in their network environ- 
ment. Finally, Burt (1980) studied 
the interlocking behavior of man- 
ufacturing firms and found inter- 
locking directorates to be 
important in achieving cooptive ar- 
rangements with other firms. 
Fennema and Schijf (1978/79) ar- 
gue that interlocks are best under- 
stood in the context of an 
interorganizational network. They 
state: "Network analysis is critical 
to the study of interlocks because 
it takes into consideration intercon- 
nectedness of organizations and 
whether some organizations are 
more central and have more stra- 
tegic position than others" (1978/ 
79: 332). 
The literature suggests that for- 
mal interlocks through common 
board members with other orga- 
nizations is an important method 
for obtaining resources from the 
environment. The more director 
interlocks, the more central the or- 
ganization will be in the resource 
network (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). Therefore, it is hypothe- 
sized: 
Hypothesis 1: 
The number of interlocking directorates 
formed by an agency will have a positive 
effect on the network centrality of the 
agency in exchanging services and clients 
with other agencies. 
A positive relationship between 
the number of interlocking direc- 
torates and centrality in a resource 
sending network would imply that 
the agency has acquired power by 
virtue of an ability to initiate an 
exchange with numerous organi- 
zations (Boje and Whetten, 1981). 
Failure to confirm the hypothesis, 
on the other hand, would suggest 
that centrality as an outcome of an 
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ability to initiate exchanges with 
numerous agencies does not nec- 
essarily lead to power within a 
network. 
Centrality and Joint Programs 
Pfeffer and Salancik cite several 
variables that are of critical impor- 
tance in understanding how inter- 
organizational relations can be 
managed. One of the most impor- 
tant of these is joint programs or 
joint ventures. Joint programs are 
purposive actions undertaken by 
agencies facing similar issues in or- 
der to meet common objectives 
(Aiken and Hage, 1968). Joint pro- 
grams can be used, for example, to 
reduce uncertainty and risk sur- 
rounding the delivery of various 
services and the acquisition of 
scarce resources through the for- 
mation of temporary alliances (Aid- 
rich, 1979). 
Aiken and Hage (1968) exam- 
ined the effects of joint programs 
on organization structure, and 
found that social service agencies 
offering many joint programs had 
organic, highly complex structures 
supplemented by an increase in 
professional staff. Pfeffer and No- 
wak (1976) in a longitudinal study 
of manufacturing and gas and oil 
exploration firms found that joint 
ventures and joint activities usually 
occurred among firms operating in 
similar industries. Aldrich (1979) 
has noted that joint programs are 
common among human service 
agencies and offer economic, tech- 
nical, and cooperative benefits to 
those organizations involved. 
The level of research on joint 
program activity in the context of 
resource exchange networks has 
been sparse. However, resource de- 
pendence theory does suggest sev- 
eral hypotheses that can be tested. 
Organizations engaging in joint 
programs are likely to enter this 
form of coordinative activity in or- 
der to secure an adequate flow of 
those critical resources. Therefore, 
joint programs should be found to 
be associated with network central- 
ity as an outcome of resource de- 
pendence. It is hypothesized: 
Hypothesis 2: 
The number of joint programs will have 
a positive effect on the centrality of the 
agency in exchanging services and clients 
with other agencies in the network. 
A positive relationship would imply 
that the agency has been successful 
in coordinating and controlling the 
flow of resources in the network. 
Centrality and Adminstrator 
Contacts 
As previously stated, interlocking 
directorates is an organization's at- 
tempt to coordinate activity with 
another organization. However, an 
agency's top management may also 
engage in other activities that fa- 
cilitate the flow of resources in a 
network. Aldrich (1979) suggests 
that agency administrators may 
serve on boards of other organi- 
zations in order to obtain impor- 
tant information for their 
organization. Whetten and Aldrich 
(1979), in a study of human service 
agencies, found that administrative 
heads of agencies engaged in 
boundary spanning and had influ- 
ence over many cooperative inter- 
organizational relations. 
Resource dependence theory 
posits the administrator's role to be 
that of representing the organiza- 
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tion to the environment. Organi- 
zations needing many critical 
resources will have many contacts 
among top managers. Frequent lev- 
els of director contact within a re- 
source network indicates an 
agency's assessibility to other agen- 
cies with respect to resource 
exchanges. 
Therefore, the frequency of ad- 
ministrator contacts should be as- 
sociated with the organization 
occupying a central position in a 
network without specific regard to 
power or dependence. Director 
contacts erve to link organizations 
in a general way (Rogers, 1974a). 
Therefore, it is hypothesized: 
Hypothesis 3: 
The number of informal contacts agency 
directors have with administrators of 
other organizations will have a positive ef- 
fect on the centrality of the organization 
in exchanging services and clients in the 
network. 
Centrality and Board Size 
Pfeffer and Salancik state that 
the size of the board of directors 
is a function of the organization's 
attempt to establish favorable link- 
ages with the environment. Larger 
boards are used to facilitate growth 
through the boundary spanning ac- 
tivity and to increase the potential 
for interlocks with other firms. In 
the private sector, a large board is 
more visible, can interlock with fi- 
nancial firms, and can bring in use- 
ful environmental information. 
Agency boards are composed 
mostly of members who are ap- 
pointed to the board by public of- 
ficials, and who are considered to 
be beneficial to organizations fac- 
ing environmental pressures. Large 
board size should give an agency a 
relative advantage in the network. 
It is, therefore, hypothesized: 
Hypothesis 4: 
The larger the board of directors, the 
greater the centrality of the organization 
in resource exchange networks. 
Centrality and Organization Size 
Pfeffer and Salancik argue that 
large organization size will "render 
the organization more visible, re- 
quiring more social support. Also 
large size probably means the or- 
ganization would have larger finan- 
cial requirements which might also 
increase dependence on the local 
environment" (1978: 171). Using 
this argument, large agencies prob- 
ably will be dependent on the net- 
work for client referrals and for 
help in administering services. 
Large size, therefore, should be 
positively associated with receiving 
resources in the network. 
Hypothesis 5: 
The larger the size of the organization, 
the greater the centrality of the organi- 
zation in the receiving of resources in a 
network. 
METHODOLOGY 
Sample 
The sample for this study in- 
cludes 52 non-profit agencies that 
deliver counseling, health, and re- 
ligious services to youth in a large 
metropolitan area. The agencies 
are linked together through infor- 
mation exchanges, youth service 
support, and client referral net- 
works. The agencies were also ac- 
tively engaged in interlocking, joint 
programs, and other board activity. 
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The specific agencies were iden- 
tified through direct contact with 
agency directors and through social 
service directories. The conceptual 
boundary of the network was 
thereby identified, as were specific 
agencies. As a result, 53 agencies 
were targeted for study, and 52 
complied and granted interviews 
with the top agency officials. 
The interviews involved a one 
hour in length data gathering 
meeting with each agency's direc- 
tor - the top agency administrative 
official. The directors all consid- 
ered their agencies to be part of 
this interorganizational network. 
The interviews were pilot tested 
prior to the study. 
The study examines the ex- 
change of critical resources among 
a network of human service agen- 
cies. The term "network" refers to 
the methodology employed on the 
sample, while "resource exchange" 
is a descriptive term regarding ac- 
tivities among organizations in the 
network. Client referrals and serv- 
ices rendered to clients are the crit- 
ical resources exchanged by these 
agencies. Clients and services are 
the basic raw materials of the agen- 
cies and are the basis upon which 
affiliation with the network is 
drawn. Moreover, the exchange of 
clients and services comprises the 
essential strategic activity for the 
agencies which serves to legitimize 
the organization and attract outside 
funding (Provan, 1984). 
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables for this 
study are four measures of cen- 
trality derived from the 52 agencies 
that form an interorganizational 
network of relations. The four 
measures are: 1) services sent cen- 
trality, 2) clients sent centrality, 3)
clients received centrality, and 4) 
services received centrality. Cen- 
trality is determined by the number 
of relations or links necessary to 
contact other agencies in the net- 
work. It is calculated from the ratio 
of the total number of links among 
agencies in a network over the sum 
of the links of each individual 
agency. Thus, the greater the total 
number of links among all agencies 
in the network (numerator) and the 
fewer the number of links it takes 
a particular agency to reach others 
in the network (denominator), the 
more central the agency (Lin, 
1976). The most central agency is 
one that requires relatively fewer 
links to contact the other agencies 
in the interorganizational network. 
An agency occupying a central po- 
sition in the exchange of clients 
and services is essentially "closer" 
to other agencies in the network. 
In this study, centrality was cal- 
culated from the choices made by 
the top-ranking agency administra- 
tors relative to the client and serv- 
ices exchanges in the network. In 
other words, agency administrators 
were asked to nominate the agen- 
cies with which they exchanged 
services and clients. Specifically, 
each of the 52 administrators were 
asked to list the agencies: 
- to which they sent services, - from which they received 
services, 
- to which they sent clients, and - from which they received 
clients. 
The administrators surveyed were 
the top-ranking agency officials 
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and were identified as those most 
capable of representing the agency 
with regard to these resource ex- 
changes (Provan, Beyer, and Kru- 
ytbosch, 1980). 
The administrators' nominations 
were analyzed using Marsden's 
(1976) "Digraph" network analysis 
program. The calculation of cen- 
trality was based on the ratio of the 
total number of relations among 
top administrators to the number 
of relations for a specific agency. 
The closer or more accessible an 
agency was to others in the net- 
work, the greater the centrality of 
that agency. 
There are a number of measures 
of network centrality in the litera- 
ture, each with an associated sub- 
stantive meaning (see Freeman, 
1978/79). Some measure "equiva- 
lence," some measure "between- 
ness," and some "closeness." Our 
purpose is not to review them here. 
However, the "Digraph" measure 
of centrality was chosen because it 
identifies which organizations are 
"closest," in a relational sense, to 
others in the network for specific 
types of relations. If an organiza- 
tion has close client or service ties 
with other organizations - in other 
words - is "more central," then the 
organization is substantively more 
important in the network; and 
power and dependence can be in- 
ferred (Oliver, 1990). 
Therefore, a fundamental prin- 
ciple of network analysis is that 
power can be inferred from the 
patterns and from the content of 
exchange relations (Blau and Alba, 
1982). This principle is supported 
in several studies which demon- 
strate that centrality is a surrogate 
for power (Boje and Whetten, 
1981; Fombrun, 1983). Another 
principle that is of critical impor- 
tance in understanding the nature 
of resource exchanges is the direc- 
tion (sent or received) of relations. 
Lincoln and McBride (1985), in a 
study of human service agencies, 
found direction or asymmetry of 
interorganizational ties to be an im- 
portant predictor of resource de- 
pendencies. Therefore, the depen- 
dent measures in this study indicate 
both the content and direction of 
relations. 
Two of the measures, services 
sent and clients sent centrality, are 
indicators of network power. Serv- 
ices and clients are valued re- 
sources and agencies that have 
options to send them are powerful 
(Provan, 1983). The direction of 
the exchange relationship (sending) 
is important. Organizations which 
send services are providing knowl- 
edge and expertise to other orga- 
nizations in the network, and are, 
therefore, powerful (Levine and 
White, 1961; Weinstein and Mo- 
ravec, 1977; Provan et al., 1980). 
Examples of services exchanged in- 
cluded workshops, training, advice, 
and counseling. 
Likewise, agencies which send 
clients to other organizations are 
powerful (Rogers 1974a, 1974b). 
Clients are the raw material and 
primary resource of the agencies 
(Provan, 1984). An agency that 
sends these resources to others will 
be perceived by directors to be 
influential. 
Centrality in receiving clients de- 
notes dependence because an 
agency, in this case, must rely on 
others in the network to secure (re- 
ceive) scarce valued resources. By 
becoming central with regard to re- 
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ceiving clients, an agency attempts 
to reduce risk, uncertainty, and in- 
crease legitimacy (Pfeffer and Sal- 
ancik, 1978; Provan et al., 1980). 
Centrality in receiving services 
also indicates dependence (Wein- 
stein and Moravec, 1977). Consid- 
eration of the type and direction of 
the relation again indicates the type 
of interdependence involved. 
Agencies named as receiving many 
services are clearly dependent on 
others in the network for infor- 
mation and expertise. Therefore, 
there are two centrality measures 
dealing with power and two dealing 
with dependence. The four cen- 
trality measures are the dependent 
variables and are defined as 
follows: 
Services Sent - Centrality in the 
services ent network. The types of 
service included counseling, profes- 
sional advice, technical and medical 
information, and other types of 
youth service. 
Services Received - Centrality in 
the services received network. This 
measure was also obtained from 
the director interview where each 
director was asked to name agen- 
cies from which services were 
received. 
Clients Sent - Centrality in the 
client referral network. An agency 
that has the ability to send valuable 
resources to other agencies is in a 
powerful position in the network. 
The measure was obtained from 
the interview question: "To what 
agencies do you refer clients?" 
Clients Received - Centrality in 
the clients received network. This 
measure taken from the interview 
denotes the agency's position with 
respect to obtaining scarce 
resources. 
Independent Variables 
The independent variables for 
this study were also obtained from 
the agency director interviews. The 
variables are as follows: 
Interlocks - This is the number 
of formal interlocking directors for 
each agency. A list of board mem- 
bers was obtained from each 
agency and the number of inter- 
locks were simply counted. The in- 
terlocks were what Pennings (1980) 
calls general interlocks, where a 
given director sits on the board of 
two or more agencies. This method 
of counting interlocks is common 
in the literature (e.g., Fennema and 
Schijf, 1978/79; Marolis and Jones, 
1982). 
Joint Programs - This independ- 
ent measure indicates the degree to 
which agencies are linked through 
joint programs. Agency directors 
were asked to cite other agencies 
with which there was interorgani- 
zational coordination through joint 
programs and regular meetings. 
Examples of joint programs in- 
cluded employee training and 
client treatment programs. The 
measure represents the number of 
joint programs with other agencies 
in the network for each agency. 
The number of programs was ver- 
ified through agency records. 
Administrator Contacts - This mea- 
sure indicates the number of infor- 
mal administrator contacts for each 
agency. The top agency officials 
were asked to name the administra- 
tors of other agencies within the net- 
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work with whom frequent contact, 
telephone conversations, and other 
correspondence were made. 
Board Size - This is the number 
of members of the board of direc- 
tors for each agency. A formal ist 
of board members was obtained 
from each agency. 
Size - This is simply the number 
of full and part-time mployees in 
each agency obtained from the di- 
rector interview and verified 
through agency records. While 
there are many issues involved in 
measuring organization size, this 
measure is consistent with interor- 
ganizational literature (e.g., Boje 
and Whetten, 1981). 
Ordinary least-squares regression 
was the statistical technique chosen 
to test the relationships hypothe- 
sized. Regression was chosen be- 
cause it allows for the examination 
of the specific effects of each of the 
five independent variables on each 
of the four dependent measures. 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Zero-order correlations, means, 
and standard deviations for the 
study variables are given in Table 
1. The client exchange networks 
exhibited the greatest standard de- 
viations of the dependent meas- 
ures, indicating that the exchange 
of clients varied more than that of 
services in the network. Interlocks, 
joint programs, and administrator 
contacts have small means com- 
pared to the standard deviations. 
This indicates that some of the 52 
agencies had little director activity 
TABLE 1 
Means, Standard Deviations, Correlations 
Service Service Oient aient Joint Admin. Board 
Variable Mean Dev. Sent Ree. Sent Ree Interlocks Prog. Contact Size 
Service Sent 5105 1.84 
Service Received 52.01 1.42 .00 
Client Sent 54.40 10.55 .20 .20 
Qient Received 56.93 16.76 .18 -.30 .18 
Interlocks .92 1.45 35 -.15 -.19 .26 
Joint Programs 1.31 1.93 .04 .41 -.12 .04 .07 
Administrator Contact 1.73 2.00 .31 .04 .21 .35 .04 -.03 
Board Size 9.96 11.42 -.05 -.06 -.09 -.05 .21 .08 .02 
Agency Size 20.73 33.78 -.09 -.12 .09 .34 .14 -.05 .36 .02 
but others were heavily engaged in 
interlocking, joint programs, and 
administrator contacts. The corre- 
lation matrix showed little inter- 
correlation among the variables. 
Table 2 presents the standard- 
ized regression coefficients and R2s 
for the four regressions. When the 
dependent variable services sent 
was regressed on the independent 
variables, the result was a signifi- 
cant R2 (.30). The adjusted R2 for 
services sent was .23. With the ex- 
ception of board size, the coeffi- 
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TABLE 2 
Standardized Regression Coefficients 
Joint Administrator Board Agency R2 
Dependent Variables Interlocks Programs Contacts Size Size (Prot»F) 
Service Sent .40** .02 .41*** -.14 -.29" .30 
(.004) 
Service Received -.16 .43* •• .11 -.06 -.12 .23 
(.032) 
Oient Sent -.18 -.09 .20 -.05 .04 .10 
(.433) 
Qient Received .24* .06 .27* -.11 .22 .24 
(.023) 
♦ p < .05 •• ' p < .01 ••• p < .001 
cients were all in the hypothesized 
directions. Therefore, the inde- 
pendent variables were good pre- 
dictors of power in terms of 
sending services in the network. 
The prediction for services re- 
ceived was also significant with the 
R2 and adjusted R2 being .23 and 
.14, respectively. Joint programs 
and director contacts had coeffi- 
cients in the hypothesized direc- 
tion. The other variables were not 
found to be associated in the hy- 
pothesized direction, though the 
coefficients were small. 
The equation for clients ent was 
the weakest of the four (R2 = .1O). 
The largest effect was for admin- 
istrator contacts, and this was also 
the only coefficient hat indicated 
association with clients sent in the 
hypothesized direction. 
The R2 for the dependent vari- 
able clients received was .24 and 
was significant. All independent 
variable coefficients, except board 
size were in the hypothesized di- 
rection. Board of director and top 
agency administrator activity 
served to increase the ability of the 
agency to receive resources. 
Therefore, three of the depend- 
ent variables resulted in good pre- 
dictions and all of the significant 
regression coefficients were in the 
predicted directions. This indicates 
that the coordinative activities pro- 
posed by Pfeffer and Salancik do 
indeed link the organization with 
its environment according to re- 
source dependencies. 
Support for the hypotheses can 
be determined by examining the 
standardized coefficients. Itwas hy- 
pothesized that interlocking direc- 
torates would increase network 
centrality for the four substantive 
relations. Interlocks were signifi- 
cant positive predictors of services 
sent (.40) and clients received (.24) 
centrality. The other two coeffi- 
cients were not in the direction pre- 
dicted but were not significant. 
Therefore, there is support for hy- 
pothesis one. Interlocks were 
found to link the organization with 
those powerful agencies in sending 
services and receiving clients. 
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The number of joint programs 
was found to be significantly asso- 
ciated with services received (.43). 
This indicates ome support for hy- 
pothesis two. Joint programs were 
common among agencies depend- 
ent on others in the network for 
the delivery of service. There were 
no associations of any note between 
joint programs and indicators of 
resource control. Thus, joint pro- 
grams were found to occur among 
less powerful agencies who did not 
or could not offer full service to 
clients. 
Contact among the top admin- 
istrators in the network was also a 
strong predictor of services sent 
and clients received (.41 and .27, 
respectively). The informal contacts 
served as boundary spanning activ- 
ity in securing resources for the 
agencies. This is as predicted by hy- 
pothesis three. For the services re- 
ceived and clients sent measures, 
the coefficients were fairly large 
but not significant, which further 
corroborates the hypothesis. 
Hypothesis four was not sup- 
ported. Board size was not associ- 
ated with either client or service 
centrality. Furthermore, the coef- 
ficients were all in the opposite di- 
rection. Large boards did not put 
the agencies in strategically central 
positions in the network. 
Hypothesis five had partial sup- 
port in the finding that large size 
was negatively associated with serv- 
ices sent centrally. Size was hypoth- 
esized to be associated with 
dependence, and while services 
sent indicated power in the net- 
work, the negative relation denoted 
that large size decreased services 
sent centrally. However, it was ex- 
pected that size would have a po- 
sitive association with services 
received, but this was not the case. 
The clients sent and received coef- 
ficients also were not in the hy- 
pothesized direction. Particularly 
puzzling is the strong but not sig- 
nificant relation with clients re- 
ceived. Large organizations were 
central in receiving client re- 
sources. Therefore, the size find- 
ings are mixed and there is no clear 
indication that size leads to power 
or dependence. 
The best overall predictors were 
interlocking directorates and ad- 
ministrator contacts. Top agency 
management affected interorgani- 
zational resource dependencies to 
a great degree. Board size, on the 
other hand, did not appear to be 
of much importance to human 
service agencies. Joint programs 
was a strong predictor of only one 
dependent variable. As with other 
organization theory research, find- 
ings with regard to size were dif- 
ficult to explain. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Pfeffer and Salancik attribute in- 
terorganizational influence to im- 
portant resource exchanges, and 
assume that these exchanges must 
be managed to ensure organization 
effectiveness. They argue that or- 
ganizations will develop relations 
among boards of directors to ne- 
gotiate or manage their environ- 
ments. Moreover, they consider 
joint programs, sharing board 
members, and organization size as 
important exchange factors. The 
results of the present study indi- 
cated that these strategic relations 
were important predictors of inter- 
organizational centrality measures. 
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Much of the organization theory 
literature indicates that coordina- 
tion by important actors such as di- 
rectors is critical to the survival of 
the organization (e.g., Aldrich, 
1979). Indeed, resource depend- 
ence theory makes this argument 
explicitly. 
Supportive of the theory was the 
finding that interlocking director- 
ates were strongly related to cen- 
trality in interorganizational 
resource exchanges. We learned 
that interlocks were strategically 
used to link organizations with 
their environments. Further re- 
search should specifically address 
the effects various types of inter- 
locks have on power and depen- 
dence. 
Resource dependence theory 
propositions with regard to joint 
programs as strategies for manag- 
ing resource dependencies were 
also warranted. This study found 
that joint programs constituted a
response to dependence in the net- 
work. Future studies should at- 
tempt to identify which specific 
joint program activities indicate 
power and which indicate depen- 
dence. 
The resource dependence no- 
tions related to administrator con- 
tacts and organization size had 
some support by the findings. Di- 
rector contact was related with 
measures of resource control, while 
size indicated both power and de- 
pendence relations. Indeed, size 
may be a surrogate for success as 
suggested elsewhere in the litera- 
ture (e.g., Aldrich, 1979); or the 
larger the agency size the more the 
boundary spanning staff that can 
serve to link the agency in the net- 
work. We can conclude, for net- 
work of youth delivery agencies 
such as this, that large size merely 
indicated a high volume of service 
and clients processed, and was in- 
dependent of relative interorgani- 
zational influence. 
Three of the four dependent 
variables resulted in relatively good 
predictions. Clients sent, however, 
did not. It does, however, present 
an interesting caveat. We inferred 
network power from the ability to 
send clients to other agencies, as 
suggested by previous empirical 
work (Provan, 1984). While this 
may indeed be the case, others 
have argued (such as Hall, 1987: 
232-233) that clients could be sent 
to other agencies because the focal 
agency lacks the expertise to pro- 
vide the service. In the latter case, 
the interorganizational relation 
would indicate a form of depend- 
ence. Future research that refines 
the measurement of the content 
and direction of interorganizational 
exchanges is necessary for this issue 
to be resolved. 
The basic argument that the 
board of directors is used by or- 
ganizations to provide linkages with 
the environment is supported by 
this study. The board serves to link 
the organization through various 
types of relationships, and put it in 
a strategically important position in 
the network. Thus, within the con- 
straints posed by resource depend- 
encies, directors negotiate central 
positions for their organizations. 
This underscores the critical im- 
portance of the director's role in 
organizations which function in 
networks marked by resource de- 
pendent relationships (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978). 
This study found that interlocks, 
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administrator contacts, and joint 
programs increased in the organi- 
zation's centrality in a network. If, 
indeed, central organizations can 
coordinate activity better than oth- 
ers, this improved coordination can 
lead to better service at lower costs. 
Thus, agency board members and 
directors can use these principles in 
examining and establishing their 
interorganizational relationships. 
However, several assumptions 
relative to board membership are 
inherent in this research. It is as- 
sumed that board members are ho- 
mogeneous with respect to the role 
they fill for the agency. That is, 
that they are active in representing 
the agency on whose board they 
are serving, and that they make de- 
cisions in the agency's best interest. 
Additionally, this research assumes 
that members of boards are at least 
initially equal in power and ability 
to participate on the board. It is 
possible, however, that board mem- 
bers act in their self interest and 
are appointed merely for political 
reasons. While these alternative ex- 
planations for board member activ- 
ity are not controlled in this study, 
we feel that the findings are likely 
to be robust to them. We feel that 
important strategic linkages among 
directors and the consequences of 
these linkages have been examined, 
regardless of the underlying moti- 
vation. Future research should 
more explicitly address these 
assumptions. 
Managerial Implications 
This research should prove use- 
ful to managers and directors in a 
variety of industries, primarily be- 
cause as environments become 
more uncertain and resources 
more scarce, interorganizational 
linkages are sure to increase. If this 
pattern holds true, directors and 
managers can develop linkages to 
more adequately ensure access to 
critical resources. The system for 
developing these linkages involves 
these steps: scanning the environ- 
ment and identifying critical re- 
sources, activating top managers 
and directors, and evaluating the 
results of the linkages. 
Scanning the Environment - The 
first step in developing linkages is 
environmental scanning. Scanning 
should be used to identify sources 
of critical resources and what ac- 
tivities facilitate the acquisition of 
these resources. For the agencies in 
this study, the critical resources 
were clients and services. In other 
industries, critical resources might 
include raw materials, highly 
trained personnel, financial re- 
sources and venture capital, or in- 
formation on markets, demo- 
graphics, competitors, and techno- 
logical developments. Identifying 
critical resources may be straight- 
forward and obvious. However, 
identifying the activities that lead 
to securing them may not. For the 
agencies in this study, interlocks 
and administrator contacts facili- 
tated the exchange of both clients 
and services; while joint programs 
helped in gaining access to services. 
In other industries, simple contact 
among managers may be enough 
to accomplish access to raw mate- 
rials or personnel. However, more 
complex forms of coordination 
may be necessary to acquire ven- 
ture capital or critical information. 
For example, joint programs may 
provide a logical means for sharing 
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capital, labor, and technological ex- 
pertise with another organization. 
Interlocks may potentially provide 
critical information on markets, 
technology, or demographics in an 
industry through the sharing of in- 
formation among directors. All in 
all, environmental scanning should 
help managers identify opportuni- 
ties for securing resources. 
Activating Top Managers and 
Directors - Once potential linkages 
to secure resources have been iden- 
tified, managers and directors 
should be encouraged to fill their 
entrepreneurial role and partici- 
pate actively in them. Board mem- 
bers should be urged to sit on 
boards of organizations that supply 
or use the resources of their or- 
ganization. Managers should be en- 
couraged to communicate with the 
managers of organizations that ex- 
change resources. A steering com- 
mittee of the board of directors 
should be formed to make specific 
assignments, set up conferences, 
and in general, oversee and coor- 
dinate these linkages. 
Evaluation of Results - Finally, 
managers and directors should 
evaluate their performance relative 
to these linkages. The steering 
committee should be put in charge 
of this. The evaluation should cen- 
ter on the themes identified in this 
study. In other words, managers 
and directors hould ask questions 
such as: how central is our orga- 
nization in the exchange of re- 
sources? What organization is most 
central in our industry? How did 
that organization become most 
central? 
If the organization has been suc- 
cessful or central in developing 
linkages, the access to critical re- 
sources should be relatively stable, 
and the probability of the organi- 
zation's survival should be greatly 
enhanced. 
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